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ALIMONY, ALIMONY PAYIN’ YOUR BILLS†:
RETHINKING THE TERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE
FOR COHABITING UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Illinois is one of few states that allows for the termination of maintenance (formerly known as alimony or spousal support) for cohabiting.1 Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
(“IMDMA”), an ex-spouse that is paying maintenance can terminate
that obligation if she shows the recipient spouse “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.”2 This “working
definition” has evolved through Illinois caselaw on cohabitation.
However, Illinois courts continue to grapple with the meaning of cohabitation and likewise pinball their applications of factors developed
over the last few decades. Collectively, Illinois courts implement what
is commonly known as the “de facto marriage test” for finding cohabitation. The factors for this test are found in virtually all dating relationships, such as vacationing together, eating meals together, and so
forth.
Importantly, one of the purposes for awarding a spouse maintenance is to provide her with financial support until she can become
self-supporting or to ameliorate her sacrifice in a long-term marriage
where she devoted her time to domestic duties instead of obtaining
education and marketable skills. For a long-term marriage, the homemaker spouse may be entitled to receive permanent maintenance of
some amount per month based on the parties’ incomes and other factors under the statute. However, if the recipient spouse enters into a
dating relationship, there is a risk that her maintenance can be terminated, even if the dating relationship is short-term and does not intend
to lead to marriage. For recipient spouses that are without a fixed income and that are without any chance of entering the labor force, the
termination of maintenance causes severe financial hardships.
For the reasons that follow in this Article, Section 510(c)’s provision
for cohabitation as a maintenance terminating event must be abrogated; an exception for gray divorcees should be carved out; termina† Living Loving Maid by LED ZEPPELIN (1969).
1. Denise Erlich, Grounds For Terminating Or Modifying Illinois Spousal Support, ERLICH L.
OFF., LLC, https://erlichlegal.com/blog/modifying-illinois-spousal-support/ (last visited May
16June 17, 2021); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c) (2019).
2. 5/510(c).
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tion of maintenance sought on cohabitation grounds should be
reviewable; or alternatively, the Supreme Court of Illinois should establish a factor test that focuses on the financial positions of the payee
and discard the current factors, found in all dating relationships, in
order to prevent future inequity that follows by terminating maintenance for cohabiting.
This Article discusses the inequities caused when maintenance is
terminated for cohabiting. Part I discusses dissolution proceedings in
Illinois, followed by relevant statutory provisions for calculating the
amount and duration of maintenance under the IMDMA. Then, the
statutory provisions for terminating maintenance under the IMDMA
are outlined, followed by statistics of divorce, marriage, and cohabitation rates in the United States. Next, a survey of Illinois case law on
cohabitation and the ultimate development of the de facto marriage
test is provided. Part I also provides relevant Illinois policy and its
interplay with terminating maintenance under the IMDMA. Part II
then provides an analysis on how the current operation of Section
510(c) leads to inequitable results that cause severe financial hardship,
contravene Illinois policies, and pose future harm for particular
groups of divorcees. Part II concludes by providing a menu of solutions to ameliorate the inequities caused by the current operation of
Section 510(c). Part III illustrates the impact these solutions will have
going forward. Finally, Part IV concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part proceeds in six sections. Section A discusses the general
process for petitioning for a dissolution of marriage in Illinois. Section
B describes maintenance under the IMDMA and how the amount and
duration of maintenance awards are calculated. Section C provides
the statutory ways for terminating maintenance. Section D illustrates
statistical data for divorce, marriage, and cohabitation rates in the
U.S. Section E presents a survey of Illinois case law discussing the
factors used for determining cohabitation. Section F discusses relevant
Illinois policy for issues regarding cohabitation.
A. Dissolution Proceedings in Illinois
Dissolution proceedings in Illinois begin when a spouse files a petition for dissolution of marriage.3 A petition for dissolution of mar3. Kevin O’Flaherty, How To File for Divorce in Illinois — Illinois Petitions For Dissolution
Of Marriage Explained, O’FLAHERTY L., https://www.oflaherty-law.com/learn-about-law/filinga-petition-for-dissolution-of-marriage (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
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riage in Illinois must consistconsists of certain elements: grounds for
dissolution, with irreconcilable differences being the only grounds for
divorce in Illinois; if the parties have children, then the allocation of
parental responsibilities, which consists of decision-making authority
and parenting time (formerly known as custody and visitation, respectively) and child support; maintenance; and the disposition of property
and debts.4 In the event the parties’ circumstances to a dissolution
proceeding do not involve one of the above elements, the petition
should still indicate so.5 For instance, if no children were born out of
the parties’ marriage, then the petition must state that no children
were born out of the parties’ marriage.
Dissolution proceedings may involve either a contested or an uncontested divorce.6 A joint simplified dissolution may be brought by
parties for an uncontested divorce.7 It is a quick divorce procedure
(the prove-up may be the same day of the filing or soon after) that
requires fewer forms and ultimately saves the parties money on attorneys’ fees.8 To qualify for this expedited dissolution, the parties must
meet certain requirements, such as having no children born out of the
marriage, waiving maintenance, and having no jointly-owned real
property.9 If the parties jointly own real property or have children,
then a joint simplified dissolution is unavailable. However, a contested
or uncontested divorce is possible depending on the circumstances of
the parties’ agreeableness.10
In either a contested or uncontested divorce, maintenance may be
sought by the party who can show a need for spousal support.11 In an
uncontested divorce, the parties agree on nearly all issues brought
under the petition, and any remaining issues can be reserved, such as
the payment of any post-secondary education expenses.12 Parties to an
uncontested divorce that agree on maintenance may incorporate pro4. Illinois Legal Aid Online, Divorce training for attorneys, YOUTUBE (July 16, 2018), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7Bwkeu5WyI.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Joint Simplified Dissolution of Marriage Information and Instructions, ILL. FIRST JUD. DIST.
CLERK CIR. CT. COOK CTY., http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/NewWebsite/Services/Filing-for-a-Joint-Simplified-Dissolution-of-Marri.aspx (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
8. Joint simplified divorce with no children, ILL. LEGAL AID ONLINE, https://
www.illinoislegalaid.org/legal-information/joint-simplified-divorce-no-children (last visited May
16June 17, 2021).
9. Id.
10. What is a contested or uncontested divorce?, ILL. LEGAL AID ONLINE, https://
www.illinoislegalaid.org/legal-information/what-contested-or-uncontested-divorce (last visited
May 16June 17, 2021).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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visions for such in their marital settlement agreement (“MSA”).13
However, in a contested divorce, parties cannot come to an agreement
on issues such as the disposition of property and debts, maintenance,
or the allocation of parental responsibilities; therefore, the case ultimately goes to trial where the court makes the final determination as
to any issues.14 Where maintenance is an issue and being sought by
one of the parties, the court may award a spouse maintenance if the
court should findfinds that maintenance is appropriate by analyzing
factors set forth in the statute, as discussed more fully below.15
B. Maintenance Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act
Under the IMDMA, the court has the authority to grant a spouse
an award of maintenance when appropriate.16 When one spouse pays
13. What Should Be Included in an Illinois Divorce Settlement?, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES,
P.C. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.andersonandassociatespc.com/schaumburg-divorce-lawyer/
what-should-be-included-in-an-illinois-divorce-settlement. See, e.g., SAMPLE MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, http://www.divorce-lawyers-chicago.com/docs/sample-marital-settlementagreement.pdf (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
14. ILLINOIS LEGAL AID ONLINE, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a) (2019). In determining whether an award of maintenance is
appropriate, the court considers multiple factors. 5/504(a)(1)–(14). These factors include:
(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and
non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance as well as all financial
obligations imposed on the parties as a result of the dissolution of marriage;
(2) the needs of each party;
(3) the realistic present and future earning capacity of each party;
(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking
maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or
delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;
(5) any impairment of the realistic present or future earning capacity of the party
against whom maintenance is sought;
(6) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate
education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself
or herself through appropriate employment;
(6.1) the effect of any parental responsibility arrangements and its effect on a party’s
ability to seek or maintain employment;
(7) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(8) the duration of the marriage;
(9) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and the needs of each of the parties;
(10) all sources of public and private income including, without limitation, disability
and retirement income;
(11) the tax consequences to each party;
(12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education,
training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;
(13) any valid agreement of the parties; and
(14) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-4\DPL404.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 5

31-DEC-21

ALIMONY, ALIMONY PAYIN’ YOUR BILLS

10:46

671

the other spouse money on a continuing basis after the dissolutiondivorce, this is referred to as maintenance. The spouse paying
maintenance is called the payor and the spouse receiving maintenance
is called the payee. Maintenance provides the payee a financial means
to support herself after the dissolution of her marriage.17 Courts have
reiterated that the policy behind maintenance is to provide financial
support to the payee until she is financially independent in the future
and “to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through marriage to
enjoy a standard of living commensurate with that during the marriage.”18 In other words, the general goal behind awarding maintenance is to provide a payee spouse sufficient income until she can
become self-supporting, or if she cannot become self-supporting, then
to provide her a way to afford a lifestyle comparable to the one she
enjoyed during the marriage when there was two pools of income or
only her spouse’s income from which expenses were paid. Maintenance is not meant to function as a societal benefit where the state
steps in to support the spouse. Unlike child support, where one of the
goals of enforcing support orders is to reduce the risk of public
charges, the underpinnings of maintenance are individually based.19 If
a spouse is in need of spousal support, and the other spouse has sufficient income and assets from which to pay, then she is going to be
obligated to support her ex-spouse if a court decides somakes that
finding.
1. Calculating the Amount of Maintenance under the IMDMA
After the court makes a finding that maintenance is appropriate,
the amount and duration of maintenance is then calculated.20 First,
the amount of maintenance is determined by the court through its use
of the IMDMA’s statutory guidelines if it is a guideline case.21 ApplyId.
17. The court may also award temporary maintenance during the dissolution proceedings. 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/501(a)(1) (2018). However, this Article focuses on maintenance paid to recipient spouses for a reviewable term (and indefinitely) after the dissolution of marriage.
18. In re Marriage of Girrulat, 578 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Marriage of
Liszka, 77 N.E.3d 1000, 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
19. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(1)–(14) (determining whether an individual is entitled to
maintenance based on statutory factors); Financial Aspects of Divorce, Spring 2019, DePaul
University College of Law.
20. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(b-1)(1)(A). Of note, the calculation of maintenance is typically done using programs, such as Family Law Software. The calculation itself is not as lofty of
an issue, but practitioners still deal with issues of imputing income to either spouse, whether a
spouse is truly reporting all her income, and so forth.
21. 5/504(b-1). The court may also order non-guideline maintenance if, for example, the application of the IMDMA’s guidelines amount to an award of maintenance and child support that
exceeds 50% of the payor’s net income. Id.
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ing the guidelines, the amount of maintenance is “calculated by taking
33 1/3% of the payor’s net annual income minus 25% of the payee’s
net annual income.”22 When added to the net income of the payee,
this calculated amount cannot be “in excess of 40% of the combined
net income of the parties.”23 For example, if Spouse A has a net income of $100,000 and Spouse B has a net income of $30,000, the calculation of maintenance for these parties would be as follows:
Maintenance = ($100,000 x 33.33%) – ($30,000 x 25%)
Maintenance = $33,330 – $7,500
Maintenance = $25,830 per year (or $2,152.50 per month) Next, the
calculated amount of maintenance ($25,830) cannot exceed 40% of
the parties’ combined net income ($130,000) when added to Spouse
B’s income. To illustrate:
$100,000 + $30,000 = $130,000 (parties’ combined net income)
$25,830 / $130,000 = 19.86% (maintenance as a percentage)
Since the maintenance percentage is less than 40% of the parties’
combined income, it would not be reduced to the statutory limit.
2. Calculating the Duration of Maintenance Under the IMDMA
After the amount of maintenance is calculated, the next step is calculating the duration of maintenance, which is likewise derived
through the IMDMA’s guidelines.24 Under the guidelines, the duration of maintenance is calculated by multiplying the number of years
of marriage, which is the time between the date of marriage and the
date of filing the petition for dissolution, by a factor provided in the
statute.25 For example, if Spouse A and Spouse B from the prior example were married for 16 years, then the duration of maintenance
payments is calculated as follows:
22. 5/504 (b-1)(1)(A).
23. Id.
24. 5/504(b-1)(1)(B) (“The duration of an award [of maintenance] shall be calculated by multiplying the length of the marriage at the time the action was commenced by whichever of the
following factors applies: less than 5 years (.20); 5 years or more but less than 6 years (.24); 6
years or more but less than 7 years (.28); 7 years or more but less than 8 years (.32); 8 years or
more but less than 9 years (.36); 9 years or more but less than 10 years (.40); 10 years or more but
less than 11 years (.44); 11 years or more but less than 12 years (.48); 12 years or more but less
than 13 years (.52); 13 years or more but less than 14 years (.56); 14 years or more but less than
15 years (.60); 15 years or more but less than 16 years (.64); 16 years or more but less than 17
years (.68); 17 years or more but less than 18 years (.72); 18 years or more but less than 19 years
(.76); 19 years or more but less than 20 years (.80). For a marriage of 20 or more years, the court,
in its discretion, shall order maintenance for a period equal to the length of the marriage or for
an indefinite term.”).
25. Id.
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16 (years of marriage) x 0.68 (statutory factor) = 10.9 years (or 130.8
months)
Therefore, Spouse A’s monthly payments of $2,152.50 to Spouse B
would be ordered for 130.8 months.26 Under the IMDMA’s guidelines, it is possible for a spouse to receive maintenance payments indefinitely.27 However, unless both parties expressly agree otherwise, a
payee spouse receiving indefinite maintenance payments is at risk of
future maintenance termination.28

26. Effective on June 1, 2018, Public Act 100-0520 codified amendments to Section 504. See
H.B. 2537, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017). The Act amended the IMDMA to allow a person to
choose whether he or she wants to continue using his or her former spouse’s name or his or her
maiden name under 5/413(c); to increase the income cap under 5/504(b-1)(1) guidelines; to remove the previous duration multipliers of maintenance under 5/504(b-1)(1)(B); and to give the
court the discretion whether to credit payor spouses with payments made to payee spouses for
temporary maintenance during dissolution of marriage proceedings under 5/504(b-1)(1.5). Id.;
see also Stephanie L. Tang, 2017-2018 Survey of Illinois Law: Family Law, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 845,
855–57 (2019). Prior to the 2018 amendments, the Section 504 duration multipliers incentivized
parties seeking maintenance to wait until enough time has passed for the next multiplier to
apply. Id. at 856. For instance, a spouse in a fourteen-year marriage that filed under the former
maintenance statute would be able to receive eight years and five months of maintenance payments. Id. However, if a spouse waits one more year, so he or she would be in a fifteen-year
marriage, then he or she would be able to receive twelve years of maintenance payments. Id.
Public Act 100-0520 reduced the incentive for spouses to wait to file for dissolution of marriage
through altering the duration multipliers. H.B. 2537, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017). Now, under
the current section 504, a spouse in a 14-year marriage would only receive one year and two
months more of maintenance payments if he or she waited one more year to file. Tang, supra
note 26, at 856–57.
27. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(b-1)(1)(B) (“For a marriage of 20 or more years, the court, in
its discretion, shall order maintenance for a period equal to the length of the marriage or for an
indefinite term.”). Relevantly, “[i]f a court grants maintenance for an indefinite term, the court
shall not designate a termination date. Indefinite maintenance shall continue until modification
or termination under Section 510.” 5/504(b-4.5)(2). In addition to indefinite maintenance, a
spouse may also receive fixed-term maintenance or reviewable maintenance. 5/504(b-4.5)(1), (3).
If the court grants fixed-term maintenance, then the payment of maintenance is barred after the
period during which maintenance is to be paid ends. 5/504(b-4.5)(1). Reviewable maintenance,
on the other hand, is granted for a specific period subject to review when that period ends. 5/
504(b-4.5)(3). The court, upon review, “may extend maintenance for further review, extend
maintenance for a fixed non-modifiable term, extend maintenance for an indefinite term, or
permanently terminate maintenance . . .” 5/504(b-8); see 5/504(b-4.5)(3). The court may not
make a finding under subdivision (b-8) if maintenance is terminated under Section 510. 5/504(b4.5)(3). Under the IMDMA, only indefinite maintenance and reviewable maintenance (which
may be extended indefinitely) are terminable under Section 510. 5/504(b-4.5)(2)–(3). Fixed-term
maintenance, on the other hand, is not expressly terminable under Section 510 because after the
set period of maintenance ends, maintenance automatically terminates. 5/504(b-4.5)(1).
28. 5/510(c).
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C. Cohabitation of Payee Spouse as Grounds for Terminating
Maintenance
Under the IMDMA, a payor spouse’s obligation to pay future maintenance to the payee spouse can be terminated by three ways expressly outlined under Section 510(c). For each terminating event,
unless the parties stipulate in writing to the contrary, a payor’s maintenance obligation is terminated if: (1) either party dies, (2) the payee
spouse remarries, or (3) the payee spouse “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.”29 The third terminating
event is the subject of this Comment.
If maintenance is terminated based on a payee’s cohabiting, then
the payor spouse’s obligation to pay future maintenance ends on the
date the court finds that the cohabitation began, and the payor spouse
is entitled for reimbursement of any maintenance payments paid after
that date.30 For instance, if the payor spouse can prove that the payee
began cohabiting within the meaning of Section 510(c) on October 1,
2019, and the payor spouse made ten maintenance payments since
that date, the payor spouse may be reimbursed for those ten months.
The IMDMA does not define “resident, continuing conjugal basis.”31 Therefore, Illinois case law has developed factors used by the
courts to determine whether a payee spouse is cohabiting within the
meaning of Section 510(c).32 These factors include: (1) length of the
relationship; (2) amount of time the couple spends together; (3) nature of the activities the couple engages in; (4) the interrelationship of
the couple’s personal affairs; (5) whether the couple vacationed together; and (6) whether the couple spent holidays together.33 Each
case is fact-dependent. When courts apply the factors, the factors used
and their respective weight vary, so a court’s decision after applying
the factors likewise varies from case to case. Collectively, the courts’
inquiry is ultimately whether a payee spouse’s relationship rises to the
level of a de facto marriage.34 A de facto marriage is understood to
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See generally 5/510; see also 5/510(c).
32. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walther, 110 N.E.3d 221, 227 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); In re Marriage of Herrin, 634 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re Marriage of Miller, 40 N.E.3d
206, 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); In re Marriage of Thornton, 867 N.E.2d 102, 109–110 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007); In re Marriage of Snow, 750 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); In re Marriage of
Susan, 856 N.E.2d 1167, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); In re Marriage of Sunday, 820 N.E.2d 636, 640
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 442–443 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 379–82 (Ill. 1985).
33. Herrin, 634 N.E.2d at 1171.
34. Yet, the unpredictability of the courts’ findings of a de facto marriage slashes the ease with
which practitioners can apply precedent to their clients’ cases.
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mean that the couple is living together as husband and wife and finding that this type of relationship exists requires looking at the payee
spouse’s behavior after the judgment of dissolution is entered.
However, prior to the 1977 amendments to the IMDMA that inserted grounds for terminating maintenance for cohabiting, courts and
matrimonial lawyers did not deal with cohabitation issues that arise
under the current version of Section 510. Previously, the law in Illinois
supported the proposition that a former spouse’s right to maintenance
was “not affected by the moral quality of her post-divorce conduct.”35
However, shortly after the 1977 amendments, courts had to determine
the legislature’s intent behind the type of conduct that would qualify
as cohabitation.36 For example, the court in In re Support of Halford
stated:
Our task in this case is to determine what conduct was intended by
the legislature to be grounds for termination . . . We believe that it
was the intention of our legislature to provide for the termination of
an ex-spouse’s obligation to pay future maintenance whenever the
spouse receiving maintenance has entered into a husband-wife relationship with another, whether this be by legal or other means.37

D. Divorce, Marriage, and Cohabitation Rates and Statistics for
Divorcees
Recent data trends of marriage and divorce rates in the U.S. mark a
significant change from past years.38 This shift includes the divorce
rate of individuals aged 50 and older, otherwise known as “gray divorce.”39 From 1990 to 2015, the number of divorces for people aged
50 and older has increased more than 109%.40 While the divorce rate
for this age range has significantly increased, the marriage rate for
35. Hall v. Hall, 323 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
36. See generally In re Support of Halford, 388 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
37. Id. at 1134. The court in Halford continued to state that the “statute contemplates acts of
sexual intercourse as part of the full or de facto husband-wife relationship . . .” Id. Additionally,
the court defined “conjugal basis” to mean the implication of the assertion of conjugal rights
defined as “the right which husband and wife have to each other’s society, comfort and affection” and “the right of sexual intercourse between husband and wife.” Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 374 (4th ed. rev. 1968) & WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
480 (1971)).
38. Renee Stepler, Led by Baby Boomers, divorce rates climb for America’s 50+ population,
tbl.1, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/09/led-bybaby-boomers-divorce-rates-climb-for-americas-50-population/; I-Fen Lin et al., Marital Biography, Social Security Receipt, and Poverty, 39 RES. ON AGING 86, 89 (2016).
39. Stepler, supra note 38; Lin et al., supra note 38, at 87.
40. Stepler, supra note 38.
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younger individuals aged 18 to 34 has plummeted.41 For instance,
compared to 59% of young adults who were married in 1978, only
29% of young adults were married in 2018.42
Along with these changes for divorce and marriage rates, cohabitation rates have likewise experienced a substantial shift.43 As of 2016,
cohabitation rates among adults have risen 29% since 2007.44 In other
words, of the 18 million cohabiting relationships in 2016, people aged
50 and older account for about 23% of cohabiters—increasing by 75%
since 2007.45 Similarly, cohabiting relationships among young adults
aged 18 to 34 have increased by 1.7 million.46 In fact, young adults in
this age range are more likely to be cohabiting than marrying, and the
majority has never been married at all.47 In contrast, a majority of
cohabiters aged 50 and older are divorced.48 This number is significant
because prior research on the economic well-being of adults based on
varying marital biographies has disregarded gray divorce.49 Since
1990, gray divorce has doubled and is more prevalent among individuals who remarry, who are less educated, and who have fewer economic resources.50 Though the future consequences of gray divorce
are unclear, scholars see it as likely that gray divorce poses alarming
financial repercussions for individuals who have been out of, or have
41. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Releases 2018 Families and Living Arrangements Tables (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/
families.html.
42. Id.
43. Renee Stepler, Number of U.S. adults cohabitating with a partner continues to rise, especially among those 50 and older, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2017/04/06/number-of-u-s-adults-cohabiting-with-a-partner-continues-to-rise-especially-among-those-50-and-older/.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at tbl.2 (“[M]ajorities of cohabiters younger than 50 have never been married, including nearly all cohabiters ages 18 to 24 (97%) and 85% of those 25 to 34. About half (52%) of
cohabiters ages 35 to 49 have never been married . . .”).
48. Id. at tbl.3 (“Among cohabitors ages 50 and older, a majority (57%) are in their 50s.
Another three-in-ten are in their 60s, while one-in-ten are in their 70s. Just 3% of cohabiters
ages 50 and older are in their 80s or older.”); see also Lin et al., supra note 38, at 95 (For individuals aged 50 and older “who are in a cohabiting union, roughly 6 in 10 are divorced . . . Divorced
individuals are more often . . . cohabiting than remarried if their divorce occurred after age 50
. . .”).
49. Lin et al., supra note 38, at 89.
50. Id. at 91; see also id. at 98 (“Cohabitors tend to be less educated than marrieds and remarrieds after divorce.”); id. at 105 (“Gray divorced women . . . receive smaller Social Security
benefits, on average, than all other single women and men. They also confront exceptionally high
poverty levels at roughly 27%. By comparison, gray divorced men’s poverty is 50% lower.”).
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never been in, the labor force, such as stay-at-home wives and individuals who have fewer economic resources.51
E. Illinois Courts’ Treatment of the De Facto Marriage Test under
Section 510(c)
Illinois courts vary in their applications of the test to find whether a
former spouse “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing
conjugal basis.”52 The tests range from courts finding cohabitation
when a couple’s relationship involves dating aspects that do not affect
the payee spouse’s need for financial support to courts finding cohabitation in cases where no dating aspects are found, but a shift in the
payee’s financial circumstances is shown. Further, in finding cohabitation, some courts apply a totality of the circumstances test, and other
courts instead focus on certain factors.
1. The Six-Factor Cohabitation Test Established by In re Marriage
of Herrin
In In re Marriage of Herrin, the Illinois appellate court developed a
six-factor test for determining whether a payee spouse’s relationship
with another person amounted to cohabitation.53 In Herrin, the payee
ex-wife and her boyfriend “saw each other every day for over 2 1/2
years, spent most evenings together, engaged in sexual relations, took
vacations and spent holidays together.”54 The boyfriend “spent the
night at [the ex-wife’s] residence every other weekend (when the children stayed with the [ex-husband]), ate most of his meals there, gave
[the ex-wife’s] phone number to his clients so they could reach him
there, used the [ex-wife’s] car as much as 90% of the time, and borrowed money from [the ex-wife] to pay his child support.”55 Lastly,
the ex-wife “took out loans to pay for [her boyfriend’s] van and computer . . . [and the ex-wife and her boyfriend] discussed marriage, but
decided against it for financial reasons.”56 The court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision granting the payor spouse’s petition to
51. Id. at 91. Gender roles illustrate the economic disparities between men and women. Id.
(“Women are economically disadvantaged compared with men and this gender disparity widens
with age. Despite rising female labor force participation in recent decades, a majority of women
receive Social Security through spousal . . . benefits rather than on the basis of their own
contributions.”).
52. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c) (2019).
53. 634 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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terminate his maintenance obligation because his ex-wife and her boyfriend were engaged in a resident, continuing conjugal relationship.57
Prior to Herrin, a primary factor that Illinois courts used for finding
cohabitation was whether cohabitation materially affects the payee
spouse’s need for financial support.58 For example, the court in In re
Marriage of Sappington stated that “an important consideration . . . is
whether the cohabitation has materially affected the [payee] spouse’s
need for support.”59 Therefore, relying on Sappington,60 the ex-wife in
Herrin argued that her relationship with her boyfriend was not a de
facto marriage because the evidence was insufficient to show that her
relationship “materially affected her need for support.”61 The Herrin
court refuted the ex-wife’s claim and “found that a demonstrated need
for support cannot be controlling and in itself does not defeat a petition to terminate maintenance when . . . all other factors demonstrate
a resident, continuing, conjugal relationship exists.”62 The Herrin
court ultimately found that while trial courts may “consider the financial interaction between the interested parties, that factor is not controlling . . .”63
Thus, the court in Herrin established the following factors to determine whether the nature of the relationship between the payee exwife and her boyfriend amounted to a de facto marriage: “(1) its
length; (2) the amount of time [the payee ex-wife and her boyfriend]
spent together; (3) the nature of the activities they engaged in; (4) the
interrelation of their personal affairs; (5) their vacationing together;
and (6) their spending holidays together.”64 The court further stated
that courts should also use the totality of the circumstances test.65
57. Id. at 1172.
58. See In re Marriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
59. 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); see also In re Marriage of Bramson, 404 N.E.2d
469, 473 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of Arvin, 540 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); In re
Marriage of Caradonna, 553 N.E.2d 1161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Johnson, 574
N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Marriage of Klein, 596 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Reeder v. Reeder, 495 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
60. 478 N.E.2d at 381 (quoting Bramson, 404 N.E.2d at 473) (“[T]he legislative intent does not
appear to be an attempt to control public morals . . . Rather, an important consideration, divorced from the morality of conduct, is whether the cohabitation has materially affected the
recipient spouse’s need for support because she either received support from her co-resident or
used maintenance monies to support him.”).
61. Herrin, 634 N.E.2d at 1171.
62. Id. at 1172.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1171.
65. Id.
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2. In re Marriage of Weisbruch
Five years following the Herrin decision, another Illinois appellate
court in In re Marriage of Weisbruch implemented a different set of
factors to determine whether an ex-wife’s non-romantic, same-sex relationship constituted cohabitation within the meaning of Section
510(c).66 In Weisbruch, the ex-wife and her friend bought a home and
titled it in joint tenancy, divided household expenses, shared a joint
account, co-signed loans for each other, listed each other as co-owners
on their cars, named each other in their wills, and named each other as
primary beneficiaries of their life insurance policies.67 The court ultimately concluded that the ex-wife’s relationship was more than a casual friendship due to their financial arrangements.68
The ex-wife argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that
her relationship constituted cohabitation.69 Namely, the ex-wife
pointed to the lack of a sexual relationship; the ex-wife slept in a separate bedroom most of the time and the lack of public affection.70 Contrary to the court in Herrin that found a financial need for support is
not determinative, the court in Weisbruch relied heavily on the financial implications of the relationship at issue because they are the
“most relevant to determining the need for maintenance . . .”—the
court stated.71 The Weisbruch court noted that the purpose of Section
510(c) is to prevent the injustice of requiring the payor spouse to continue paying maintenance to the payee spouse who then “uses the
money to support someone else or is receiving support from someone
else.”72 This purpose for terminating maintenance was commonly articulated by courts pre-Herrin that focused primarily on the financial
need of the payee spouse. The Weisbruch court, however, did not follow Herrin’s line of reasoning (dating relationship factors), and instead reverted back to the line of reasoning articulated in cases like
Sappington (financial intermingling).
The payee spouse in Weisbruch was still in need of financial support; however, the Weisbruch court ultimately terminated her maintenance.73 In doing so, the court recognized the inconsistencies of its
66. In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (Illinois Second
District Appellate Court); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c).
67. Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 441.
68. Id. at 445.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 443.
72. Id. at 444.
73. See Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 444.
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holding and the holding in Sappington.74 Both Weisbruch and Sappington recognized that the payee spouse’s “needs are not being completely met by his or her new partner[,]”75 but the court still
terminated maintenance anyway. The Weisbruch court explained that
the reason for these inconsistencies is that Section 510(c) does not
allow maintenance payments to be reduced on a proportional basis.76
In other words, cohabitation exists, or it does not. If it does, then a
payee spouse’s maintenance is terminated regardless of her financial
needs. Finally, the court reaffirmed its position that “if the receiving
spouse remarries or cohabits, maintenance is terminated even if the
new partner’s contributions are less than the former spouse’s maintenance obligations. The same is true even if the receiving spouse is in
fact supporting the new partner.”77
Notably, the Weisbruch court did not cite to or mention the factors
established in Herrin. The ultimate inquiry is to determine whether a
couple’s cohabiting rises to the level of a de facto marriage.78 However, the Weisbruch case involved a same-sex relationship.79 The exwife in Weisbruch argued that her relationship could never be conjugal or a de facto marriage because of Illinois’s policy against same-sex
marriages at the time.80 The court concluded by stating the lack of a
sexual relationship does not prevent a relationship from being conjugal and cited to Halford for the proposition that maintenance can be
terminated “whenever the receiving spouse has entered into a husband-wife relationship with another, whether this be by legal or other
means.”81
3. In re Marriage of Snow
Two years after the Weisbruch court departed from the factors set
forth in Herrin, the court in In re Marriage of Snow applied the Herrin
six-factor test and found the existence of a de facto marriage.82 In
Snow, the ex-wife lived with a former neighbor for a year and a half.83
The neighbor paid rent, paid half of the utilities, and contributed to
74. Id.; In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. 1985).
75. Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 444; Sappington, 478 N.E.2d at 381–82.
76. Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 444.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Prior to the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision in 2015 that legalized same-sex marriage, same-sex marriage was illegal in Illinois. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
(2015).
80. Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 443.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. 750 N.E.2d 1268, 1270–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (Illinois Third District Appellate Court).
83. Id. at 1270.
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household chores.84 The ex-wife and the neighbor had sexual relations
and mingled with the ex-wife’s friends.85 Yet, they did not pay for each
other’s personal expenses, commingle funds, or plan to enter into a
serious, committed relationship.86 The court determined their relationship rose to the level of a de facto marriage under the six-factor
test notwithstanding the relationship’s lack of financial intertwinement.87 The court established that financial intertwinement was not a
necessary condition in order to find cohabitation.88 Thus, the Snow
decision reaffirmed that courts should apply the six factors from Herrin, including that financial intertwinement was not necessary for finding cohabitation.
4. In re Marriage of Miller
The appellate court’s decision in In re Marriage of Miller narrowed
the Herrin/Snow six-factor test.89 There, after the dissolution of her
twenty-five-year marriage, the ex-wife was awarded permanent maintenance.90 Shortly thereafter, the ex-wife began exclusively dating her
boyfriend, which lasted for six years.91 The ex-husband, on the other
hand, had remarried immediately after the divorce.92 The ex-wife’s
boyfriend stayed with her Thursday through Sunday, and they were
members of the same golf course.93 The couple vacationed and spent
holidays together, but they never commingled their finances and always paid for expenses and meals separately.94 The couple’s romantic
connection eventually dwindled.95 They stopped spending weekends
together and the boyfriend terminated his golf course membership.96
By the time the ex-husband filed his petition to terminate his maintenance obligation, the couple’s relationship resembled that of a
friendly companionship.97
84. Id. at 1269.
85. Id. at 1270.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1271.
88. Leon I. Finkel & Katelyn A. Blanchard, Dating, Maintenance, and Miller, 104 ILL. BAR J.
34, 36 (2016).
89. Tang, supra note 26, at 868.
90. In re Marriage of Miller, 40 N.E.3d 206, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (Illinois Second District
Appellate Court).
91. Id. at 213.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 222.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 215.
96. Miller, 40 N.E.3d at 215.
97. Id.
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The trial court, applying the Herrin/Snow test, found that the exwife and her former boyfriend had entered into a long-term, exclusive
relationship where they spent a significant amount of time together;
they traveled, golfed, dined out, and spent holidays together.98 The
court noted that although the couple did not commingle finances, they
shared a golf membership.99 Thus, the trial court found their relationship rose to the level of a de facto marriage and terminated the exwife’s maintenance.100 On appeal, the appellate court reversed the
trial court’s decision.101 The appellate court found that the couple’s
relationship established companionship and exclusive intimacy, but it
lacked a deep level of commitment, permanence, and financial partnership.102 The appellate court reasoned that there was no evidence
that the couple intended to make their relationship permanent, to
commingle finances, or to share a home or household duties.103 Therefore, the couple was in an intimate dating relationship but not a de
facto marriage.104 However, in so holding, the Miller court stated the
Herrin/Snow six-factor test was not enough—the totality of the circumstances should be the inquiry.105 After the Miller decision, Illinois
courts were uncertain under what circumstances a party’s relationship
would constitute cohabiting under Section 510(c).106 This uncertainty
paved the way for the court’s decision in In re Marriage of Walther.107
5. In re Marriage of Walther
In Walther, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding
that held the payee’s relationship did not amount to cohabitation.108
The parties in Walther expressly provided for the repercussions of the
payee spouses’ cohabitation in their MSA.109 The agreement stated
that “[payor’s] maintenance obligation would terminate if ‘[payee] cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis in
accordance with Section 510(c) . . .’”110 Applying the Herrin/Snow
98. Id. at 222.
99. Id. “Happy learned how to putt. Uh-oh.” Happy Gilmore (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 224.
102. Miller, 40 N.E.3d at 227.
103. Id. at 228.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 227.
106. Tang, supra note 26, at 868; see also Miller, 40 N.E.3d at 206; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
510(c).
107. In re Marriage of Walther, 110 N.E.3d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
108. Id. at 227.
109. Id. at 224.
110. Id.
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factors, the Walther court stated that the payee spouse shared a bedroom with her boyfriend and regularly had sex with him; kept clothing
at her boyfriend’s house; regularly bought the boyfriend’s groceries
and prepared his meals; freely entered and left the house; spent all
major holidays with the boyfriend; and moved her daughter to her
boyfriend’s house.111 The trial court held that the payee spouse’s relationship did not amount to cohabitation.112 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision under these facts and remanded with
directions only to determine the date upon which the payor spouse’s
obligation to pay future maintenance terminated.113 The appellate
court in Walther, ultimately followed Miller’s lead and applied the totality of the circumstances test, but it also applied the Herrin/Snow
six-factor test.114
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Robert Carter, illustrates
how fact-specific the cohabitation analysis is.115 He expressed that the
majority erred by not giving enough deference to the trial court as to
the factual and credibility determinations in the case.116 Justice Carter
reiterated that the payee spouse’s relationship lasted only eleven
months, and she testified that she did not intend for her relationship
to be permanent.117 Also, Justice Carter noted the little evidence that
was presented to determine how long the payee spouse spent with her
boyfriend during the relationship, including what daily activities they
engaged in.118 Further, Justice Carter emphasized that the payee
spouse and her boyfriend did not share any financial accounts and
received all statements for their accounts at their own addresses.119
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, Justice Carter stated
he would affirm the trial court’s ruling—denying the payor’s petition
to terminate maintenance.120

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 224–25.
Id. at 226.
Walther, 110 N.E.3d at 229.
Id.
Id. (Carter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Walther, 110 N.E.3d at 231.
Id.
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F. Relevant Illinois Policy and the Interplay of Section 510(c)
1. Recently Articulated Illinois Policy Against Common-Law
Marriage
Common-law marriage has been expressly prohibited in Illinois for
over a century.121 Therefore, individuals who cohabit and are not formally married have no conjugal rights akin to married couples under
the IMDMA.122 For instance, cohabiters cannot seek maintenance
under Section 504 or property disposition under Section 503.123 The
Illinois policy against common-law marriages has been articulated
more recently in Brewer v. Blumenthal.124 In Brewer, a same-sex
couple cohabited for over twenty-six years.125 The parties exchanged
rings, presented themselves to their families and friends as a committed couple, had three children that shared the same last name, commingled their assets, jointly purchased a home, and had a joint bank
account.126 Upon the termination of their relationship, both parties
brought common-law claims.127 Blumenthal moved for partition of the
couple’s home, and Brewer brought a counter-claim for a constructive
trust for the parties’ jointly owned home to prevent unjust enrichment
from the time and money she invested during their long-term relationship.128 Brewer also sought a constructive trust over Blumenthal’s income and sought restitution for funds that Blumenthal withdrew from
their joint account for her medical practice.129 Brewer’s counterclaim
acknowledged that the couple’s relationship was “identical in every
essential way to that of a married couple.”130
To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court of Illinois ultimately
dismissed Brewer’s common-law claims.131 The court held that the issue in the case was “intimately related and dependent on [the parties’]
marriage-like relationship . . .”132 However, the court acknowledged
that common-law claims may include available remedies to a party
121. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/214 (1977) (“Common law marriages contracted in this State
after June 30, 1905 are invalid.”); 12 ILL. PRAC., FAM. L. 750 5/214 (2021 ed.) (Westlaw database
updated Feb. 2021) [hereinafter 12 ILL. PRAC. FAM. L. 750 5/214].
122. 12 ILL. PRAC. FAM. L. 750 5/214, supra note 121 (“The IMDMA generally applies to
legally married couples only.”).
123. Id.
124. 69 N.E.3d 834, 851 (Ill. 2016).
125. Id. at 869.
126. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
127. Id. at 169.
128. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d at 840–41.
129. Id. at 841.
130. Id. at 840.
131. Id. at 860.
132. Id. at 855.
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that has cohabited with another if there is an “independent economic
basis apart from the parties’ relationship.”133 The court concluded that
refusing to recognize common-law claims based on marriage-like relationships supports the well-settled policy of the IMDMA that gives
“the state a strong continuing interest in the institution of marriage
and the ability to prevent marriage from becoming in effect a private
contract terminable at will, by disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”134
Further, the court’s holding reaffirmed the policy against allowing
substantial amounts of litigation involving the intimate details of the
parties’ living arrangements.135
Presently, the factors illustrated by Brewer are the same or substantially similar to the factors used to decide whether a de facto marriage
exists for determining whether a payee spouse’s post-divorce relationship amounts to cohabitation. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
since common-law marriages are prohibited in Illinois, the parties’
common-law claims in Brewer must be dismissed.136 Further, the
Court stated subsequent common-law claims brought by parties that
cohabit should likewise be dismissed to prevent litigation involving
the intimate details of the parties’ relationship.137 When a court analyzes a payee spouse’s post-divorce relationship, it focuses on the factors articulated in Brewer. If a court finds a payee’s relationship
amounts to cohabitation, it in effect determines that while commonlaw marriages are not recognized in Illinois for common-law claims,
the presence of the same factors operate to terminate the payee’s
maintenance. Under the same or substantially similar factors, Illinois
courts come to opposite conclusions.
2. Interplay of Illinois Policy and the Operation of Section 510(c)’s
Termination of Maintenance
The policy articulated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Brewer
against litigating over the intimate details of a parties’ living arrange133. Id. at 856.
134. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d at 858 (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979)).
135. Id.; Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207. The Illinois supreme court in Brewer reaffirmed its holding in Hewitt as good law; therefore, it incorporated the policy behind the decision in Hewitt in
their decision in Brewer. See also Stefanie L. Ferrari, Cohabitation in Illinois: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 561, 591 (2018).
136. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d at 858–59.
137. Id. at 851 (The Supreme Court also stated, “judicially recognizing mutual property rights
between knowingly unmarried cohabitants—where the claim is based upon or intimately related
to the cohabitation of the parties—would effectively reinstate common-law marriage and violate
the public policy of this state since 1905, when the legislature abolished common-law marriage.”)
(emphasis added).
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ments or relationships is relevant when looking at how the payor
spouse seeking termination of maintenance builds their case against
the payee spouse. Further, the policy behind the IMDMA’s provision
for maintenance awards and its calculation guidelines is also relevant
to the operation of Section 510(c).
a. The Parties’ Use of Private Investigators to Prove Cohabitation
When a payor spouse seeks to terminate her maintenance obligation, she has to prove that the payee spouse is cohabiting on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.138 Therefore, parties’ seeking redress
under Section 510(c) can typically hire private investigators to build
their case against the payee spouse.139 A private investigator helps the
payor amount gather informationfacts concerning the payee spouse’s
post-divorce relationship that she can use to prove whether a de facto
marriage exists. Private investigators can be professionally licensed in
Illinois as a private detective agency, and their expertise can range
from a national to international scale.140 They involve trained professionals that use surveillance technology to gather information for purposes of terminating maintenance and avoid detection doing so.141
Some of the equipment and services employed by these detective
agencies can include mobile surveillance, high-definition low-light
video cameras, fingerprinting, drone surveillance, DNA testing, email
tracing, internet usage, cell phone data, and computer usage, to name
a few.142 Private investigators can search through the payee spouses’
garbage to find evidence of the relationship by locating “receipts,
phone records, banking and credit card statements, letters, discarded
suspicious items, etc.”143
The evidence gathered by private investigators has been used by
courts for determining whether a payee’s relationship amounts to cohabitation. In In re Marriage of Bates, the payor employed a private
investigator to obtain evidence of the payee’s relationship in order to
provide the court with information with which it can use to to termi138. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c).
139. Janice Boback, ’Til Divorce Do Us Part: Termination of Spousal Maintenance or Alimony
Due to Cohabitation, ANDERSON & BOBACK (Oct. 17, 2020), https://illinoislawforyou.com/
spousal-support/termination-of-maintenance-alimony-due-to-cohabitation/.
140. PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR CHICAGO, http://privateinvestigatorchicago.com/2012/ (last visited June 17, 2021).
141. Id.
142. Id.; Cohabitation Investigation, ICS (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.icsworld.com/Pri
vate_Investigation_Case_Types/Cohabitation_Investigation.aspx (last visited May 16June 17,
2021).
143. Kimberly Faber, What a Private Investigator Cannot Do, LAWGICAL (Aug. 10, 2011),
https://www.pinow.com/articles/456/what-a-private-investigator-cannot-do.
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nate her the payee’s maintenance for cohabiting.144 The evidence
gathered was used at trial in addition to the private investigator’s testimony.145 In Bates, the private investigator testified that he observed
the couple “kissing and hugging on several occasions[,]” and that he
saw the boyfriend “enter [the payee’s] home several times, but did not
see him leave.”146 Further, the private investigator saw the couple
about town and observed that “[t]he two went on walks, went to movies, dined out together, and spent some nights together . . .”147 The
evidence gathered by the private investigator, which was intimate information about the couple’s dating relationship, was the subject of
lengthy litigation.148
b. The IMDMA’s Policy for Awarding Maintenance
Courts have terminated maintenance even after acknowledging that
the payee spouse was not financially independent and could not enjoy
the same or similar standard of living.149 However, the policy behind
the IMDMA’s provision for awarding maintenance is to provide the
recipient spouse with the financial means until she becomes self-supporting or to exact the same or similar standard of living enjoyed during the parties’ marriage.150 This policy becomes important when
longer term marriages are at issue. A court has the authority, after
first making a finding that maintenance is appropriate, to award a recipient spouse permanent maintenance for marriages lasting twenty
years or longer.151 In In re Marriage of Kerber, the parties were married for thirty years and four children were born out of the marriage,
all emancipated at the time of the case.152 The wife was “[fifty] years
old, ha[d] a high-school education, and [had no] specialized skills for
working outside of the home.”153 At the timeWhen the parties were
married, the wife worked as a dental assistant.154 After becoming
pregnant, the wife quit her job and stayed home to raise the chil144. 819 N.E.2d 714, 723 (Ill. 2004).
145. Id. at 722.
146. Id. at 723. Of note, the boyfriend’s intangibility (or invisibility capabilities) has never
been determined.
147. In re Marriage of Miller, 40 N.E.3d 206, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
148. Bates, 819 N.E.2d at 723.
149. See In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. 1985); In re Marriage of
Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
150. IL H.R. Tran. 2001 Reg. Sess. No. 64 (Statement by Rep. Hamos).
151. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504.
152. 574 N.E.2d 830, 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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dren.155 The wife did not resume employment until after the parties
separated in 1989.156 The husband, at the time of the parties’ divorce,
was 53 years old, and earned about $34,668 as an assistant administrator for the Illinois Secretary of State.157 The trial court entered an
order requiring the husband to pay the wife “$600 per month in rehabilitative maintenance for one year ‘at which time the court [would]
review the rehabilitative maintenance award.’”158
The appellate court reversed and held the wife should have been
awarded permanent maintenance.159
Applying the statutory factors, the appellate court noted that the
parties’ circumstances illustrate “the classic case for the award of permanent maintenance.”160 The court stated that the wife had limited
resources to independently meet her needs; she only has a high school
education, and the time that would be required for her to obtain education or training to seek employment at someplace other than a fastfood restaurant will be significant.161 The marriage involved a division
of labor, where the wife stayed at home to raise all four children over
their thirty-year marriage, which enabled the husband to gain marketable skills that allow him to earn his present salary.162 The wife was
attempting to enter the workforce very late in life with limited
skills.163 The appellate court continued:
Marriage is a partnership, not only morally but financially. Spouses
are coequals, and homemaker services must be recognized as significant when the economic incidents of divorce are determined. Petitioner should not be penalized for having performed her assignment
under the agreed-upon division of labor within the family. It is inequitable upon dissolution to saddle petitioner with the burden of her
reduced earning potential and to allow respondent to continue in
the advantageous position he reached through their joint efforts.164

Other courts in Illinois have taken a similar outlook on a spouse’s
sacrifice during a marriage to raise children as forgoing obtaining marketable skills.165
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Kerber, 574 N.E.2d at 833.
159. Id. at 833.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Kerber, 574 N.E.2d at 832 (quoting In re Marriage of Hart, 551 N.E.2d 737, 745 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring)).
165. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carpenter, 677 N.E.2d 463, 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (reversing
award of rehabilitative maintenance and awarding permanent maintenance for twenty-seven-
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In addition to forgoing education and employment during a marriage to raise children and perform domestic duties, the likelihood for
spouses to earn a reliable income post-divorce is low, according to
sociologists in this field.166 Professor Susan Brown, Co-Director of the
National Center for Family & Marriage Research, has indicated that
studies show individuals that split up after age 50 should expect their
“wealth to drop by about 50%[.]”167 This is not surprising, considering
the family’s resources are being divided, she states.168 However, incomes for women aged fifty and older provide a stark economic future.169 They collapse after a gray divorce, and researchers that have
looked at standard of living found that “when women divorce after
age 50, standard of living plunges [by] 45%. That’s about double the
decline found in previous research on younger divorced women.”170
Brown further states that the standard of living for older men drops
by 21% after a divorce, and previous studies “have found a small or
negligible effect of divorce on younger men’s incomes.”171
Further, older individuals who divorce do not see an appreciable
recovery in wealth or in standard of living.172 Brown states, “Late in
their careers, older Americans simply don’t have time to undo the financial destruction that a divorce causes. Women who spent years at
home caring for children find it difficult to re-enter the workforce.”173
Brown and I-Fen Lin’s research suggests that by 2030, the estimated
number of Americans divorcing aged 50 or older each year is

year marriage where wife “devoted her time to domestic duties, foregoing any education, training, employment, or career opportunities[,]” which severely limited wife’s earning potential and
employment opportunities); In re Marriage of Veile, 43 N.E.3d 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (reversed award of $650 a month with possible termination in five years where parties had a 28-year
marriage; remanded for determination of proper amount of permanent maintenance); In re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (upholding permanent maintenance of
$35,000 per month for 26-year marriage where wife forgone full-time employment to raise her
two children).
166. Ben Steverman, Divorce Destroys Finances of Americans Over 50, Studies Show, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/divorce-destroys-finances-of-americans-over-50-studies-show (quoting Susan Brown, Sociology Professor
at Bowling Green State University, Co-Director of the National Center for Family & Marriage
Research).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Steverman, supra note 166 (quoting Professor Brown).
173. Id.
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828,000.174 This estimate is derived from the baby boomer generation’s likelihood for divorce and the U.S. population aging.175
Additionally, according to one study, “people who [have] gone
through a gray divorce report higher levels of depression than those
whose spouses died.”176 Research suggests that the best way for gray
divorcees to recover from divorce is to “find a new spouse or partner.”177 Depression levels return to earlier levels four years after a
gray divorce, and “remarrying or re-partnering will end depression almost immediately.”178
Notably, some factors that the court considers for awarding the duration and amount of maintenance involve the factors at issue for gray
divorcees: the income and property of each party; the needs of the
party; the realistic present and future earning capacity of each party;
the standard of living established during the marriage; the age, health,
station, etc.179 While research suggests that finding a new partner after
a gray divorce will ameliorate depression, under Section 510(c), maintenance is terminated for cohabitation.180
c. Ex-Spouses Receiving Child Support and Maintenance
Maintenance payments are calculated before child support in Illinois.181 Therefore, maintenance is a deduction in determining net income for child support.182 To determine child support in Illinois,
maintenance paid is deducted from the maintenance payor’s gross income and included in the recipient’s gross income.183 Thus, the maintenance guidelines lower child support awards whenever maintenance
174. Id. at tbl.3.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing I-Fen Lin et al., Depressive Symptoms Following Later-life Marital Dissolution
and Subsequent Repartnering, 60 J. HEALTH SOC. BEHAV. 153 (2019)).
177. Id.
178. Steverman, supra note 166 (quoting Professor Brown).
179. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a).
180. 5/510(c).
181. Kevin O’Flaherty, Illinois Child Support 2019, O’FLAHERTY L. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://
www.oflaherty-law.com/learn-about-law/illinois-child-support-2019.
182. Id.; 505(a)(3)(F)(II).
183. O’Flaherty, supra note 181; 505(a)(3)(F)(II). The treatment of maintenance as a deduction is applicable for child support calculations, not for tax purposes. Notably, the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017 removed the tax deduction for payors and tax liability for payees for divorces
entered into after December 31, 2018. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131
Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See also I.R.S. PUB. 5307, https://
www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/clarification-changes-to-deduction-for-certain-alimony-payments-effective-in-2019 (last updated Mar. 24, 2021) (“Beginning Jan. 1, 2019, alimony or separate maintenance payments are not deductible from the income of the payer spouse, or includable in the
income of the receiving spouse, if made under a divorce or separation agreement executed after
Dec. 31, 2018.”).
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is awarded. In other words, if a spouse receives maintenance, then her
overall income increases.184 Likewise, if a spouse pays maintenance to
the same person that will receive child support, his overall income
decreases.185
To illustrate: Spouse A has an income of $100,000. Spouse B has an
income of $0.186 If Spouse A pays $50,000 (for the sake of simplicity)
in maintenance to Spouse B, then Spouse A’s income becomes
$50,000, and Spouse B’s “income” becomes $50,000.187 Now, each
Spouse has an income of $50,000.188 When you take both spouses’ income of $50,000 and enter it in the child support calculation that considers both spouse’s incomes, the recipient Spouse B is not getting as
much in child support because she already earns $50,000 from maintenance.189 Likewise, Spouse A will not pay as much in child support
because his new income is $50,000.190 The effect of calculating maintenance before child support is essentially lowering one person’s income
and raising the other.191
If Spouse B’s maintenance is terminated, then the recipient’s child
support is affected. All things being equal, if Spouse B, the person
who had $50,000 of maintenance, now receives nothing, then Spouse
B’s income is now $0.192 Likewise, Spouse A, the person that was paying maintenance, now has $100,000 in income.193 This results in an
increase of child support being paid to Spouse B (setting aside other
factors, such as Spouse A’s overnights with the children).194 When
Spouse B’s maintenance is terminated, then her income only consists
of child support payments, and the child support recipient must then
go back to court seeking an increase in the support award.
Admittedly, child support payments indirectly support the obligee
(parent receiving child support). Take the case of In re Keon C.,195
where the court upheld an obligor’s (parent paying child support)
184. O’Flaherty, supra note 181; 505(a)(3)(F)(II).
185. Id.
186. Conversation with Mario R. Ventrelli, Adjunct Professor of Law at DePaul University
College of Law, Partner at Ventrelli Simon, LLC (Mar. 27, 2020) [hereinafter March Conversation with Professor Mario R. Ventrelli].
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. March Conversation with Professor Mario R. Ventrelli, supra note 186.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 800 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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monthly child support award of $8,500.196 The obligee earned a net
monthly income of $731.64, which was nominal compared to the obligor’s $58,404.197 The court determined that the child support award of
$8,500 was proper, even though this amount exceeded the monthly
expenses for the obligee’s entire household.198 Since this case involved
parentage and was not a dissolution case,199 maintenance was not on
the table.200 Thus, the court held that the obligor’s monthly child support payments, albeit ersatz maintenance,201 were proper.202 Implicit
in the court’s holding is that the excessive child support award would
be indirectly used by the custodial parent for expenses such as rent,
water, and other necessities that support the parent and the child’s
standard of living.
However, Illinois courts do not allow a parent’s direct personal use
of child support. In cases involving the deviation of child support
guidelines for affluent parents, the courts have recognized the improper practice of intending a portion of child support for a spouse’s
personal use. In In re Marriage of Scafuri, the court held that the trial
court’s excessive child support award and five-year reservation of
maintenance was improper.203 The court stated that if maintenance
was warranted, then the trial court should have ordered it instead of
implicitly including maintenance in an excessive child support award
of $31,250 each for the wife and three children.204 Although the court
did not determine whether the trial court intended to, it stated that to
award any portion of the child support award as ersatz maintenance
for the wife is an improper practice.205 The court continued that
“[c]hild support is for the support of the children, and maintenance is
196. Id. at 1264.
197. Id. at 1261.
198. Id. at 1262.
199. Id.
200. Maintenance is only a possible option only if the parties were married in cases where the
parties were married. Parentage cases, on the other hand, involve unmarried individuals who
have children together. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a).
201. Ersatz, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
ersatz (defining “ersatz” as “being a usually artificial and inferior substitute or imitation”) (last
visited June 17, 2021); see also In re Marriage of Scafuri, 561 N.E.2d 402, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(noting that any intended portion of a child support award to be ersatz maintenance is an improper practice and stating that “[c]hild support is for the support of the children, and maintenance is for the support of the spouse. While the two concepts are related, one should not be
substituted for the other.”).
202. Keon C., 800 N.E.2d at 1262.
203. Scafuri, 561 N.E.2d at 402.
204. Id. at 407.
205. Id.
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for the support of the spouse. While the two concepts are related, one
should not be substituted for the other.”206
III.

ANALYSIS

The current operation of Section 510(c) and its companion case law
poses severe risks for future termination of payee spouses’ maintenance. Illinois courts have inconsistently applied the factors for finding cohabitation, on top of applying factors that serve zero purpose
for determining whether a payee’s financial position has changed. Setting aside income-producing assets that are subject to market fluctuations anyway, for many recipient spouses divorcing after a long-term
marriage, for many payees, if not most, maintenance is the only fixed
income they receive. Terminating it for the wrong reasons, under the
wrong factors, and for the wrong group of divorcees severely undercuts many policies in Illinois, including the purpose behind awarding
maintenance in the first place. The termination of maintenance causes
financial hardship, and this hardship considerably increases when focusing on individuals aged fifty and older.
This Part proceeds in four sections. First, Section A discusses the
inequities that follow from a court incorrectly applying a Section
510(c) analysis, the economic hardships gray divorcees will undergo if
their maintenance is improperly terminated, and why cohabitation
agreements are insufficient to protect against future maintenance termination. Section B illustrates how the operation of Section 510(c)
contravenes Illinois policy against common-law marriage and
IMDMA’s policy for awarding maintenance. Third, Section C discusses the risks of turning child support awards into ersatz maintenance when maintenance is terminated. Lastly, Section D provides a
menu of options for ameliorating the inequitable repercussions of successful Section 510(c) findings.
A. The Inequity of Terminating Maintenance Based on
Cohabitation Under Illinois Law
Section 510(c) of IMDMA provides payor spouses unjust recourse
to terminate their maintenance payment obligations based on a payee
spouse’s cohabitation.207 However, the idea of cohabitation under Illinois divorce law is just that—an idea—one which courts have continuously grappled with and have capriciously applied during a Section
510(c) analysis. The ultimate goal when applying Section 510(c) is to
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c).
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determine whether a payee spouse’s cohabitation is resulting in
double-pocketed income from the payor spouse and post-divorce
partner, thus causing inequity to the payor spouse.208 However, Illinois case law on cohabitation shows that courts are still unsure of the
proper test to find cohabitation and are likewise misguided in their
application of arbitrary factors that fail to show any meaningful financial connection between a payee spouse and a post-divorce partner.209
Instead, courts incorrectly look to factors that are found in virtually all
dating relationships, such as vacationing together and eating meals
together.210
The Herrin six-factor test developed a broad evidentiary standard
that left courts uncertain about how much weight they should afford
to each factor, either individually or collectively.211 Importantly, these
factors did not concentrate on a relationship’s financial intertwinement.212 Instead, courts were left analyzing aspects of a relationship
that apply to practically all dating relationships.213 Therefore, when
courts utilized the six-factor test to find whether a de facto marriage
exists, the broad scope of the test left courts more likely to find cohabitation, thus terminating maintenance.214 Further, the Herrin six-factor
test with the gloss of Snow prevented payee spouses from knowing
what type of relationship they can enter into without risking future
maintenance payments.215 For instance, could a payee spouse and her
new partner spend a lot of time together?216 How much time is too
much?217 Could they vacation or spend holidays together?218 Could
they buy one another gifts or pay for each other’s meals without these
208. The inequity results to the payor spouse because maintenance awards are ultimately determined based on the needs of the payee spouse at the time of dissolution proceedings. Thus, a
payee spouse stands to earn more from a payor spouse’s higher payment obligations. However,
once a payee spouse is cohabiting with a post-divorce partner that is contributing to the payee
spouse’s financial obligations—the payor spouse’s maintenance payments are not adjusted, or
decreased, to reflect the change in financial position of the payee spouse.
209. Tang, supra note 26, at 868; Finkel & Blanchard, supra note 88, at 35–36; see also In re
Marriage of Herrin, 634 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710
N.E.2d 439, 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); In re Marriage of Snow, 750 N.E.2d 1268 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001); In re Marriage of Miller, 40 N.E.3d 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); In re Marriage of Walther, 110
N.E.3d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
210. Tang, supra note 26, at 868–69.
211. Id. at 868.
212. Finkel & Blanchard, supra note 88, at 36.
213. Tang, supra note 26, at 868.
214. Finkel & Blanchard, supra note 88, at 36.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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actions constituting cohabitation?219 These aspects, found in nearly
every dating relationship, were often identified by the courts as aspects of a de facto marriage.220 This broad standard of the six-factor
test also created notable inequities between former spouses.221 The
payor ex-spouse was free to enter into any kind of dating relationship
without the fear of legal consequences, but the payee ex-spouse was
often left unguided about what type of dating relationship she could
enter into and often feared maintenance termination.222 After Snow,
any distinction between an intimate dating relationship and a de facto
marriage was blurred.223
A survey of these cases illustrates that the law surrounding the operation of Section 510(c) is unclear and inconsistent, resulting in inequitable decisions. Not only does the case law in this area severely
undercut the ease with which practitioners can advise their clients,
these court decisions also contradict firmly held Illinois policy. Moreover, when a court finds cohabitation exists based on the factors outlined previously, the level of inequity experienced by the payee spouse
is greater than that of the payor spouse. Of course, the payor spouse’s
perspective is worth exploring.224 One could argue that requiring a
payor spouse to remain in the workforce to afford making maintenance payments is just as inequitable as terminating maintenance to a
spouse that needs financial support. The inequity in this situation can
be based on a payor spouse’s plan of future retirement. If a payor
spouse retires at a point in time at which a court determines is “premature,” then the payor spouse risks litigating against a future imputation claim by the payee spouse. Imputation occurs when a payor, or
obligor in a child support context, becomes voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed based on the circumstances of each case.225 Typically,
219. Id.
220. Finkel & Blanchard, supra note 88, at 36.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Conversation with Mario R. Ventrelli, Adjunct Professor of Law at DePaul University
College of Law, Partner at Ventrelli Simon LLC (Feb. 2, 2020) [hereinafter February Conversation with Professor Mario R. Ventrelli]. Many thanks also to Professor Ventrelli for illustrating
the importance of understanding both parties’ perspectives.
225. Kevin O’Flaherty, How is Illinois Child Support Calculated When One Parent is Unemployed or Underemployed?, O’FLAHERTY L. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.oflaherty-law.com/
learn-about-law/how-is-illinois-child-support-calculated-when-one-parent-is-unemployed-or-underemployed (“If the unemployment or underemployment is involuntary and the parent has
made and continues to make good faith efforts to seek employment, the parent’s actual income
will be used to calculate child support . . . On the other hand, if a parent’s unemployment or
underemployment is voluntary, due to a lack of effort to find a job, a motivation to evade child
support, or passing up on potential business opportunities, the court will use the unemployed or
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the argument goes: payor quits a higher paying job and accepts a
lower paying job (if at all) for the single goal of reducing her income,
thus reducing the amount of maintenance (or child support) based on
the decreased salary, or evading her support obligation altogether.
This perspective, and the repercussions of this type of situation, is
important when determining the level of the inequities facing payor
and payee spouses during any Section 510(c) analysis.226 However, the
fact a payor spouse has the ability to quit an occupation and obtain
one with a comparable base salary supports the idea that payors do
not share the same risk when ordered to pay maintenance or other
payment obligations. It is the payee, on the other hand, that needs
financial support. The payee is not in a situation where they she
makes too much money. The payee, by the very fact they areshe is the
payee, cannot simply change jobs—it is likely she is not currently part
of the labor force.227 Instead, the payee finds herself in the precarious
situation of either having her maintenance terminated or receiving a
reduced maintenance amount when a payor successfully quits or retires from a previous job. A payor does not face these challenges. Setting aside the imputation argument, when a court incorrectly applies a
Section 510(c) analysis, the payee is harmed.
Imagine a situation where a couple is married for over twenty-five
years. The IMDMA allows a payee spouse to receive indefinite maintenance payments for a statutorily defined term of marriage.228 This
term is at least twenty years.229 The amount of maintenance is determined based on the net income of the parties with a focus on the
needs of the payee spouse.230 Therefore, a payee spouse may be
awarded, for example, in excess of $5,000 a month indefinitely. This
source of income may be the only reliable financial means to the
payee spouse, while the payor spouse is still currently receiving income from employment.
This is in stark contrast to the payee spouse that sacrificed obtaining
marketable skills during the marriage and is therefore unlikely to be
underemployed parent’s potential income to calculate child support, rather than his or her actual
income.”).
226. IL H.R. Tran. 2001 Reg. Sess. No. 64. (Statement of Rep. Hamos: “[I]t could be a
firefighter, let’s say, who had to pay maintenance. He has an injury on the job. He is now disabled. He can’t, you know, he’s living on disability. He no longer has the same income he had
before. He would be able to come in, show a substantial change in circumstances and point to
that as one of the factors.”).
227. See Part II.F and accompanying notes and text.
228. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(b-1)(1)(B); see also Part II and accompanying notes and text.
229. 5/504(b-1)(1)(B); see also Part II and accompanying notes and text.
230. 5/504(b-1)(1)(A).
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able to join the labor force after twenty or more years of static marital
duties.231 Furthermore, when the payor spouse suspects the payee
spouse is cohabiting, she has the financial capabilities to hire private
investigators to gather evidence that cohabitation exists.232 As the
case law illustrates, Illinois courts are willing to terminate a payee
spouse’s maintenance based on the existence of her spending time
with a post-divorce partner under the guise that the payee spouse is
double pocketing income. Therefore, the payee spouse is left emptyhanded after dedicating twenty or more years in the marriage. Is this
equitable? The answer is “no.” The inquiry in Illinois when courts undertake a Section 510(c) analysis should solely be the change of financial positions of the payee and payor. A payee normally provides
financial statements to refute claims of cohabitation by showing she is
not receiving “double income” from the payor and post-divorce partner. A payor that is also trying to modify her maintenance payments
based on a substantial change in circumstances already has to support
their modification claim with financial documentation. Why then,
would it be so difficult to solely base a cohabitation inquiry on the
financial aspects of the payee or payor? Do the courts truly need to
know whether a payee is vacationing or enjoying “too many” nights
out dining with someone? Indeed, basing a Section 510(c) analysis
solely on the financial aspects of the payee and payor spouse would
eliminate the unsavory task of digging through the most intimate details of the parties’ lives and prevent the courts from being bogged
down by this process—the policy expressly articulated in Brewer.

231. See also IL H.R. Tran. 2001 Reg. Sess. No. 64. (Statement of Rep. Hamos: “[I]f there is a
30-year marriage and the woman has been a homemaker during that entire period and has very
few skills with which she is able to go out and get a job, that is, in fact, the most typical situation
in which maintenance is still awarded.”).
232. See, e.g., Cohabitation Investigation, ICS (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.icsworld.com/Private_Investigation_Case_Types/Cohabitation_Investigation.aspx (last visited May 16June 17,
2021) (international private investigation services provider offering the following for cohabitation investigation: “Asset Investigation, Property Inventory, Conflict of Activity, Cohabitation
Reports, Background Investigations, Polygraph Examination Lie Detection, Semen Testing,
Bodily Fluid Testing, DNA for Hair and Skin, Covert Pregnancy Testing - Paternity Investigations, Surface Drug Testing, Surveillance, Photos of Unknown Subjects, Communications Activity, Computer Usage, Internet Usage, Email Tracing, Identity Verification, Covert and
Undercover Assignments . . .”); Alimony Termination In The Event of Cohabitation, HERITAGE
INVESTIGATIONS & SURVEILLANCE, http://privateinvestigatorchicago.com/2012/alimony-elimination/ (last visited May 16June 17, 2021) (“Our private investigators are trained to gather the
facts and look for evidence one step at a time . . . Demonstrate the major components of cohabitation including; spending nights together, sharing keys to house or garage door opener, shopping together, attending family functions together, etc.”).
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1. Gray Divorcees Undergo Severe Financial Hardship Upon
Maintenance Termination
The inequity undergone by payee spouses is heightened when focusing on the financial repercussions of gray divorcees whose maintenance is terminated. Individuals aged fifty and older who divorce are
less financially stable.233 Gray divorced women, in particular, “are the
most economically disadvantaged group” and are likely to live in poverty since the Social Security benefits they receive are insufficient to
offset their financial hardships.234 Additionally, if courts terminate
maintenance payments, gray divorcees will undergo grave financial
hardship due to their financial incapability to plan or to afford longterm care, such as nursing facilities, and will experience difficulty
when establishing an estate plan.235
Particularly for gray divorcees, cohabitation in later life has its benefits, such as not living alone and pooling humble resources when necessary.236 Unlike marriage, couples that cohabit are not liable for each
other’s medical expenses and do not have any rightful claims to each
other’s financial assets. Furthermore, cohabiters do not have to worry
about securing the transfer of their assets to their kin, and they can
remain financially autonomous. Likewise, they can receive Social Security and pension benefits that would otherwise terminate upon remarriage. For gray divorcees, the fear of forgoing maintenance
payments will prevent older individuals from entering into post-divorce relationships. Considering that the baby boomer generation accounts for about seventy-two million Americans and the divorce rates
amongst this age group continue to rise as the stigma of divorce lessens, the execution of Section 510(c) will negatively affect the social,
physical, and economic well-being of our elders.237 Can we afford to
stand idly by while our older generation lives and dies alone for fear
233. Lin et al., supra note 38, at 91. And many fail to comprehend the meaning of “pleadings.”
234. Id. at 106.
235. See Neale Godfrey, Show Me the Money: How to Protect Yourself in Gray Divorce, KIPLINGER (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T065-C032-S014-show-methe-money-protect-yourself-in-gray-divorce.html; Brent Bohan, Gray Divorce, MCKINLEY IRVIN, https://www.mckinleyirvin.com/resources/gray-divorce/ (last visited May 16June 17, 2021);
Scott Hanson, The True Cost of Gray Divorce, KIPLINGER (Sept. 25, 2017), https://
www.kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T065-C032-S014-the-true-cost-of-gray-divorce.html; Special Considerations for Gray Divorces, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/special-considerations-for-gray-divorces-37438 (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
236. Paula Span, More Older Couples Are ‘Shacking Up’, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/health/older-americans-unmarried-couples.html.
237. Richard Fry, Millennials overtake Baby Boomers as America’s largest generation, PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/01/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers/.
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of falling into poverty? Notably, men and women these days aged 65
are expected to live, on average, until 84.0 and 86.5, respectively.238
With high numbers of people getting divorced around age fifty, there
is roughly thirty-four to thirty-six years of potential solitude to account for.
Importantly, an incorrect application of the Herrin/Snow factor test
will result in termination of a gray divorcee’s maintenance. Since the
percentage of divorcing individuals aged fifty and older continues to
increase, this in turn creates a substantial risk for future poverty rates
to increase amongst this age group. Further, although age discrimination in the workplace is illegal, older women and men are less desirable from a hiring standpoint. Thus, in addition to the years of forgone
education and obtaining marketable skills, gray divorcees are at bat
against numerous factors that impede the likelihood of new future
income.
Also, with Social Security drying up, there are arguably far fewer
financial resources available for older individuals who divorce and are
thus left empty-handed. Not only are gray divorcees unable to cohabit
for fear of maintenance termination; they are also adjusting to a postdivorce life that consists of a thinning social circle as divorce forces
friends and family members to choose a side. These individuals are
also dealing with a shrinking social circle as the passing of time naturally leaves individuals in solitude. Divorce amongst this age group
has also been shown to negatively impact individuals’ mental stability.
Thus, though it might be obvious, an older individual that divorces
and cohabits with a partner shortly thereafter stands to receive the
natural benefits of companionship, assuming she is not solely after another’s financial accomplishments.
Considering that gray payee spouses already undergo devastating
economic disadvantages after marital dissolution, courts’ misapplication of the de facto marriage test will likely cause further severe economic hardships.239 These payments are often the only reliable source
of income for some payee spouses,240 and for gray payee spouses,
238. Retirement Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/retirement/planner/
otherthings.html?tl=1 (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
239. Lin et al., supra note 38, at 90; see also id. at 105 (“[I]t is gray divorced women who are
left behind when a marital dissolution occurs in late life. Divorce timing matters for women:
Early divorced women enjoy a 30% lower poverty rate than gray divorced women. Either early
divorce is less financially devastating than gray divorce or early divorced women are able to
recoup divorce-related financial losses over time.”).
240. How Gray Divorce Affects Spousal Maintenance, CALABRESE ASSOCIATES (Aug. 14,
2020), https://www.dupagefamilylaw.com/naperville-attorney/how-gray-divorce-affects-spousalmaintenance (last visited May 16June 17, 2021).
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maintenance payments help offset the economic disadvantages caused
during and after the marriage.241
2. Cohabitation Agreements are Not Remedies for Section 510(c)
Termination
Recent Illinois decisions have shown that pre- and post-nuptial
agreements are not ironclad.242 Courts have refrained from enforcing
these agreements between divorcing parties when they unfairly represent the needs of the parties.243 Though these agreements may
have provided some financial means to the payee that might offset
future termination of maintenance payments, it is not enough to rely
on them, especially when pre-nuptial agreements are executed twenty
years prior to a dissolution proceeding. During those twenty years, the
parties’ financial positions change, for better or worse. Therefore,
more focus is given to the financial status during the time of dissolution proceedings (in other words, a snapshot is taken on the day the
judgment for dissolution of marriage is entered),244 and courts confound this idea when they terminate maintenance in situations where
less than one year has passed since dissolution and the payee’s needs
have not changed. The defining line for these courts, however, is
whether the payee spouse is in a de facto marriage post-divorce—a
principle which directly contradicts Illinois policy.245 This policy is explored in the following section.
Additionally, sometimes a party might agree on adding a provision
in the parties’ MSA that states “cohabitation will not be a terminating
event.”246 Depending on the parties themselves, this might be a possible solution. However, and though it might be too obvious to state,
usually divorce involves animosity between the parties. Thus, if a future payor reads a similar provision in their MSA, naturally he or she
might be taken aback. Why would someone agree to pay maintenance
241. Lin et al., supra note 38, at 98 (“27% of gray divorce women [are] poor . . . [while] [j]ust
11% of gray divorce men are in poverty. Gray divorce women are much more disadvantaged
than other unmarried women. The percentage of gray divorce women living in poverty is higher
than that for early divorce women (19%) . . .”); see id. at 105–06 (“Nearly all gray divorceds were
married at least 10 years, meaning they are eligible for spousal benefits. Yet, the Social Security
benefits received by gray divorced women are insufficient to keep them out of poverty. Gray
divorced women are the most economically disadvantaged group . . .”).
242. See In re Marriage of Woodrum, 115 N.E.3d 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018); In re Marriage of
Kranzler, 116 N.E.3d 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
243. See Tang, supra note 26, at 883–84; Woodrum, 115 N.E.3d at 1052; Kranzler, 116 N.E.3d
at 366–67.
244. Financial Aspects of Divorce, Spring 2019, DePaul University College of Law.
245. See discussion supra Part III.B.
246. February Conversation with Professor Mario R. Ventrelli.
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to someone who is already planning on entering into a post-dissolution relationship?247 A payor is most likely not going to agree with the
idea of giving any money to the payee, even if that money is not going
to support the post-dissolution relationship.
B. Terminating Maintenance Payments under Section 510(c) Defies
Illinois Policy
1. Section 510(c) Perpetuates Financial Dependence and Ignores the
Payee Spouse’s Standard of Living
The role maintenance plays in Illinois is undercut by the operation
of Section 510(c). Though maintenance payments are not presumed as
a cure-all, or even required to provide the payee spouse sufficient
funds to exact an equal standard of living after marital dissolution,
terminating maintenance for the wrong reasons contravenes the policy
behind awarding maintenance in the first place. The 2003 amendments
to the IMDMA added various factors for a court to determine
whether an order for maintenance may be modified or terminated.248
The proponent of the bill, Illinois State Representative Julie E.
Hamos stated during House floor debates that “Maintenance is intended to help rehabilitate an ex[-]spouse . . . and is also intended to
create the same lifestyle to which that spouse had become accustomed
. . .”249
Courts have terminated maintenance even after they acknowledged
that the payee spouse was not financially independent and not enjoying the same or similar standard of living.250 Courts, however, are
apt to find maintenance termination is proper when a payee spouse is
commingling funds or is obtaining financial support from her partner.251 A payee spouse’s financial independence, for the court’s purposes, does not mean independence per se. For the courts, it is enough
to terminate maintenance under circumstances where the payee
spouse is receiving financial support independent of the payor spouse.
This practice breeds dependence. Upon termination of maintenance
payments, a payee spouse is then incentivized to sponge off their
partner.
247. Id.
248. Pub. Act 93-353, S. 363 (amending 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510) (2003) (modification or
termination of a maintenance order may only be changed upon a substantial change in circumstances). S.B. 117-92, Reg. Sess. No. 64 (2001) is the same bill (later S.B. 363) that was passed in
the Senate and subsequently introduced during the 2003 House floor debate before ultimately
passing. IL H.R. Tran. 2001 Reg. Sess. No. 64.
249. IL H.R. Tran. 2001 Reg. Sess. No. 64 (Statement by Rep. Hamos).
250. Tang, supra note 26, at 860.
251. Id. at 860 n.136, 868.
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On the flip side, it is not the same dependence for a payee spouse to
receive payments from a payor spouse she had been married to. Oftentimes, one partner—the breadwinner—remains in the workforce,
while the other—the homemaker—stays at home and performs
household duties and childrearing tasks.252 This situation is not the
same as a payee spouse dating a post-divorce partner for a few
months, vacationing together, eating meals together, and so forth. The
former accounts for the time, energy, and sacrifice that the latter
feigns to convey. Therefore, the payee spouse, without reliable income
in the form of maintenance payments from the payor, is economically
disadvantaged and judicially encouraged to seek financial stability
from a post-divorce partner. The policy behind maintenance is to aid
spouses to get back on their feet post-divorce—not saddle up the next
partner.
2. Section 510(c) Contradicts Illinois Policy Against Litigating Over
Intimate Details of Parties’ Relationships
The policy articulated in Brewer v. Blumenthal that courts should
not be overtaken by the minute, intimate details of dating relationships is also threatened by the Section 510(c) analysis.253 The inquiry
to find whether cohabitation exists is whether a couple’s relationship
rises to the level of a de facto marriage. Courts implementing the de
facto marriage test ultimately hear and weigh evidence on the length
of relationships post-divorce, the amount of time the couple spends
together, the nature of activities they engage in, the interrelation of
their personal affairs, vacations and holiday plans spent together, and
252. See Aliya Hamid Rao, Even Breadwinning Wives Don’t Get Equality at Home, THE AT(May 12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/05/breadwinning-wivesgender-inequality/589237/; see also Kim Parker & Renee Stepler, Americans see men as the financial providers, even as women’s contributions grow, tbl.1, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/20/americans-see-men-as-the-financial-providerseven-as-womens-contributions-grow/.
253. See Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834 (Ill. 2016) (affirming the decision in Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) that “effectuate[d] the policy established by the legislature to
prevent knowingly unmarried cohabitants from evading the statutory abolition of common-law
marriage under [the IMDMA] . . .”); Ferrari, supra note 134, at 568 (noting the court in Spafford
v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) that affirmed public policy in Hewitt, stated:
“[T]he real and underlying concern of the supreme court in Hewitt was that judicial recognition
of mutual property rights between knowingly unmarried cohabitants—where the claim is based
upon or intimately related to the cohabitation of the parties—would in effect grant to unmarried
cohabitants substantially the same marital rights enjoyed by married persons, resurrect the doctrine of common law marriage, and contravene the public policy enunciated by the Illinois legislature to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage.”). One might question whether
disincentivizing cohabitation through means of terminating maintenance prevents payee spouses
and his or her post-divorce partner’s relationship from rising to the level of marriage.
LANTIC
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so forth. Additionally, the payor spouse will introduce evidence typically obtained by a private investigator. By researching public records,
checking social media accounts, setting up surveillance, and even examining garbage, a private investigator may obtain evidence for a cohabitation case that includes video and photo evidence of the couples
leaving and entering the residence if someone stays overnight, and
photos from social media accounts of the couples spending holidays
and vacations together.254 This type of evidence forces parties to litigate over the intimate details of a post-divorce couple’s relationship.
Since the payor spouse is the primary earner of the marriage predissolution, she has the financial capabilities of hiring private investigators. The payee spouse, on the other hand, by the very fact they are
the recipient spouse, does not have the same economic advantage.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a payee spouse has the financial capability to determine whether the payor spouse is hiding income or obtains
a higher paying job, or to determine any significant changes to the
payor’s financial position. Interestingly, a payee spouse would never
need to hire a private investigator to determine the relationship status
of the payor spouse. Payor spouses are free to date and re-marry without any legal ramifications, unlike the payee spouse.
Further, the de facto marriage test does not align with the public
policy established in Hewitt and Blumenthal—this inquiry establishes
the opposite. Brewer dealt with expressly prohibiting the recognition
of common-law claims dependent on the parties’ intimate relationship. However, Illinois courts are using the factors, recently articulated in Brewer, as a sword and shield for finding cohabitation.
While cohabiter litigants are shown the door if the court finds their
claims are based on their marriage-like relationship, the same courts
are terminating maintenance using the same or substantially similar
factors for determining whether a de facto marriage exists. Through
this analysis, Illinois courts galvanize the recognition of common-law
marriage only to terminate payee spouse’s maintenance payments
under a de facto marriage test. Courts have expressly recognized the
inconsistencies of this practice, yet they continue to do so.

254. Terminating Alimony (Spousal Support) Due to Cohabitation, GOODMAN L. FIRM (Jan.
30, 2019), https://goodmandivorce.com/divorce/terminating-alimony-spousal-support-due-cohabitation/.
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C. Maintenance Termination Under Section 510(c) Risks Turning
Child Support Awards into Ersatz Maintenance
Terminating maintenance payments to a payee spouse that is also
receiving child support risks turning child support payments into ersatz maintenance. Since maintenance payments are included in the
parties’ income for child support calculations,255 it is presumed that
the payee spouse will use the child support payments for the child
only. However, there is no device or practice implemented by any
courts in Illinois that monitor the payee spouse’s use of child support
payments. Therefore, upon the termination of a payee spouse’s maintenance, it is likely that she will ameliorate financial strain by drawing
funds from the child support pot. Under Section 510(c), the capriciousness of the courts’ applications of the de facto test—and maintenance termination generally—severely undercuts the intended effect
of the IMDMA’s purpose of safeguarding child support awards.
Furthermore, once a payee’s maintenance is terminated, she is then
forced to go to court and file to increase her child support award.256
Since her income becomes significantly lower upon her maintenance
termination, the payor spouse might end up paying just as much to her
anyway, except now the payee is improperly using child support for
her direct personal use.
As previously stated, child support awards may be indirectly used
by the custodial parent. For example, an obligee receiving $8,500 per
month in child support might use it to pay rent and keep the water
running for that parent’s benefit, but also for the benefit of the child.
However, a court’s incorrect application of the de facto test, resulting
in maintenance termination under Section 510(c), can undercut the
IMDMA’s preventative measures for child support awards. For older
couples, child support is not a typical issue since child support payments end upon emancipation, unless other factors, such as disability,
are present. However, a shrewd matrimonial lawyer would recommend that assets should be transferred into an irrevocable trust (or
other type of trust) naming the child or children as beneficiaries. This
issue, however, is prevalent for payee spouses that are currently receiving child support.
255. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(a)(3)(A) (stating “ ‘Gross income’ includes maintenance
treated as taxable income for federal income tax purposes to the payee and received pursuant to
a court order in the pending proceedings or any other proceedings and shall be included in the
payee’s gross income for purposes of calculating the parent’s child support obligation.”).
256. See generally 5/510 (terminating or modifying maintenance, support, educational expenses, and property disposition).
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D. Menu of Solutions for Ameliorating the Repercussions of
Section 510(c)
For these reasons, the Illinois legislature must modify the IMDMA
to abrogate a Section 510(c) maintenance termination when sought on
a cohabitation basis. Alternatively, Section 510(c) should be modified
to incorporate a provision where termination of maintenance based
on cohabitation should be reviewable. This will offset economic hardships if a payee’s maintenance payments are terminated under Section
510(c). Further, a provision under Section 510(c) should be carved out
for individuals aged fifty and older who are getting divorced. The provision should provide for mandatory reviewable maintenance if termination is sought based on cohabitation. There is no risk here for due
process or equal protection claims because receiving maintenance is
not a fundamental right.
As an alternative to the Illinois legislature’s intervention, the Illinois Supreme Court should eliminate the Herrin/Snow six-factor test
and factors that focus on the intimate details of a dating relationship,
and instead establish a test that requires a sole focus on a post-divorce
couple’s financial intertwinement. If a payor spouse seeks maintenance termination in a cohabitation case, the parties should be required to file an accounting with the court. This approach traces the
financial aspects to a post-divorce couple’s relationship without wasting time and money arguing whether a few vacations or dinners out
together constitutes a committed relationship that rises to the level of
a de facto marriage.
These changes will ameliorate the injustice of terminating someone’s maintenance payments just because the court finds one or two
aspects of their relationship might mirror that of a married couple’s.
However, this focus is misplaced. Vacationing amongst couples is too
common. What is not common is when two people name each other as
beneficiaries on a trust or buy a home and title it in joint tenancy.
These factors are more suggestive of a change of financial
circumstances.257
IVII.

IMPACT

A. Abrogating Section 510(c)’s Provision for Terminating
Maintenance for Cohabiting
If the provision for terminating maintenance for cohabiting under
Section 510(c) is abrogated, then no inequity will follow when courts
257. See generally In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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incorrectly apply the Herrin/Snow test. As illustrated by the survey of
cases for finding cohabitation, Illinois courts have pinballed their applications of the factors. These factors mirror those found in virtually
all dating relationships and they serve no purpose for finding whether
a payee spouse’s financial position has changed. Using the current factors, it is more likely a payee’s maintenance will be terminated. If
maintenance is the payee’s only form of income, then this will cause
financial hardship for the payee going forward. Additionally, if the
payee spouse is also receiving child support, then by terminating her
maintenance, the payee spouse will seek more in child support in order to use that as a source of income. There is no system in place in
Illinois that monitors a parent’s use of child support. Therefore, the
risk of terminating maintenance under improper circumstances also
increases the risk of turning child support into ersatz maintenance.
These repercussions can be ameliorated if cohabitation is no longer
grounds for terminating maintenance in Illinois.
The statute still provides other ways for the termination of a payor
spouse’s maintenance obligation: death by either party and remarriage
by the payee spouse. Further, the parties are still afforded the ability
to stipulate on other maintenance terminating events outlined in their
MSA. Illinois’ deeply rooted policy for marriage is likely served by
eliminating the cohabitation means of maintenance termination.258 If
a couple is free to cohabit and spend time together in their relationship, a future marriage is more likely. If the payee spouse remarries,
maintenance terminates regardless. The current Section 510(c) impedes future remarriage.
If Section 510(c)’s provision for terminating maintenance is abrogated, then the IMDMA’s policy for awarding maintenance is better
served. The policy for maintenance is to provide the payee spouse the
financial means to become self-supporting or to ameliorate the
payee’s forgone marketable skills during the marriage. It is likely that
a payee spouse cannot obtain meaningful employment post-dissolution for these reasons. A payee’s post-dissolution relationship should
not operate to terminate her maintenance. If a payee is living with her
partner, then terminating her maintenance will first establish a financial dependence on the current partner and this dependence might
increase, which can cause strain on the relationship. However, if Illinois aims to provide payee spouses a financial means to obtain future
economic independence, then the focus should be on the payee’s fi258. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (noting that the right to marry is
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition).
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nancial situation. If cohabitation is no longer a way to terminate maintenance, then the payee will be able to cohabit with someone she may
marry in the future, while receiving an income that can allow her to
afford ordinary living expenses.
B. Carving Out an Exception for Gray Divorcees Under Section
510(c)
Alternatively, Section 510(c) should be amended to carve out an
exception for individuals who are aged fifty and older. As data shows,
individuals aged fifty and older are divorcing more frequently and
there is no reason for this trend to slow or stop.259 Cohabitation rates
are likewise increasing, of which gray divorcees make up a significant
portion. Research indicates that gray divorcees, as a group, experience
economic disparity and hardship post-divorce, and they also undergo
severe levels of depression.260 Research has also indicated that gray
divorcees that cohabit and enter into new relationships, which they
are doing anyway, ameliorate their depression and slightly help their
economic situations if they pool resources when necessary.261
However, the current Section 510(c) poses severe financial consequences on these gray divorcees. If they partner up with someone
post-divorce, then their maintenance is likely going to be terminated.
If they remain alone, they suffer from depression and difficulty with
aging. For these reasons, an exception should be carved out for Section 510(c) that expressly requires maintenance to be reviewable if the
payor is seeking termination for the payee’s cohabiting. This would
allow the court to review the parties’ situations, and to determine
whether an adjustment of maintenance is appropriate. Maintenance
for gray divorcees should be allowed to be modified on a proportional
basis. Carving out an exception for this age group does not pose constitutional issues because receiving maintenance is not a fundamental
right. Further, preventing the automatic termination of the payee’s
maintenance allows to address future financial needs for long-term
care expenses, such as nursing homes or medical expenses.
C. Maintenance as Reviewable if Termination is Sought on
Cohabitation Grounds
If a payor is seeking to terminate maintenance on cohabitation
grounds, then the court should not automatically terminate if cohabi259. See Part I.D and accompanying notes and text.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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tation is determined. If the current Herrin/Snow factors remain in use,
then finding cohabitation should only be the first step. The second
step should be reviewing the award of maintenance and adjusting the
award proportional to a financial change in the payee’s circumstances.
Modification of maintenance is already possible under the IMDMA;
therefore, the same steps to modify an award of maintenance should
be taken when termination is sought for cohabiting. This will prevent
terminating maintenance when all aspects of the couple’s relationship
can be found to amount to cohabiting, but the financial needs of the
spouse have not changed. If the payee is still living on maintenance as
her only form of income, then it would better serve Illinois policy to
require the parties to file an accounting with the court to show that
she is not receiving double income from her ex-spouse and post-divorce partner. Likewise, this process will stave payor’s attempt of
maintenance termination for the sake of punishing the payee spouse
for her cohabiting. If the payee shows that she is not financially supporting her partner or is not also receiving financial support from her
new partner, then ordering a payor to continue paying maintenance is
not inequitable—it supports the IMDMA’s policy for both parties.
D. Establishing a New Test for Finding Cohabitation
An alternative to Illinois legislative action is for the Supreme Court
of Illinois to weigh in on the inequities caused by the current test and
establish a new set of factors for determining cohabitation. The current Herrin/Snow factors are too broad and can be applied too easily
because virtually all relationships will involve the current factors in
use. Instead, the courts should use a factor test that focuses solely on
the financial positions of the payees. The factors could include, for
example, whether the couple is sharing a joint checking or savings account; whether they own jointly own property; whether they have
named each other as beneficiaries for life insurance, etc. These factors
mirror those found in Brewer and Weisbruch. However, the test
should not be to determine whether the couple is in a de facto marriage. The test should determine whether the payee’s need for financial support has significantly changed. The de facto marriage-type
relationship should not be the inquiry—it confounds Illinois’ policy
against common-law marriage.262 Further, with financially centered
factors, the courts will not be bogged down by litigating over intimate
details of the payee’s relationship. Instead, the courts will hear and
weigh evidence regarding financial issues, a practice that is already
262. See Part I.F.1 and accompanying notes and text.
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commonplace and necessary in domestic relations in Illinois. This will
ultimately save the parties time and money and will better serve Illinois’ judicial economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 510(c) contravenes Illinois reasons for awarding maintenance in the first place. By terminating a payee’s maintenance based
on cohabitation, Illinois courts are encouraging financial dependence.
Where older individuals’ only stable financial income is in the form of
maintenance payments, the Illinois legislature should carve out an exception under Section 510(c) that allows judges, if they find cohabitation, to instead make the maintenance obligations reviewable after
some time when the parties can provide financial documentation that
their circumstances have not changed.
Alternatively, the Illinois Supreme Court should determine that factors occurring in virtually all dating relationships are not the proper
focus. Instead, courts should look at the financial intertwinement of
the parties. This will ameliorate the inequities when a payee is merely
engaged in a dating relationship, yet the court incorrectly finds a de
facto marriage exists. Since the underpinnings of Illinois policy is to
encourage marriage, legislative and judicial action must take place in
order to address the realities of today in that people are increasingly
cohabiting. With a significant increase in the numbers of divorced and
cohabiting seniors, and with no indication of this trend slowing, Illinois runs the serious risk of incorrectly terminating maintenance payments on a large scale with grievous consequences.
Melanie B. Eck‡
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